Voting Technology Research Archive

Norway and Sweden

Official election guidance distinguishes paper ballot casting from electronic administration and automated counting. Norway requires a manual first count for its 2025 parliamentary election and permits automated counting for the second count. Sweden retains paper ballots for its 2026 elections even as early-vote administration becomes more digital.

Albania and the Netherlands

Albania designated electronic ballot casting and counting for 75 polling stations in its 2025 parliamentary election. The Netherlands uses paper ballots counted by hand, with software to aggregate reported totals; its Abacus software was used in 14 municipalities during March 2026 local elections.

Germany and Ireland

Germany’s historical electronic voting machines should not be confused with present-day federal practice; its 2009 court ruling required publicly verifiable elections, not an absolute ban. Ireland uses paper ballots and preference transfers under PR-STV.

Austria and Denmark

Austria’s official guidance describes paper ballots cast in person or by post; online voting-card applications do not mean online ballot casting. Denmark’s parliamentary elections use paper ballots counted publicly by polling officials. The findings are election-specific, and unverified counting technologies are not inferred.

Finland and Iceland

Finland’s Ministry of Justice describes paper ballots in the 2025 county and municipal elections. Iceland’s National Electoral Commission documents ballot boxes and an electronic electoral roll. Neither source establishes every counting technology or a comprehensive internet-voting classification; those questions remain open.

Six-country election technology review

Official guidance reviewed for the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Cyprus. Classifications are election-specific: electronic counting in Scottish local elections, electronic voter-roll checks in Cyprus, and online postal-vote administration in Greece must not be mistaken for universal internet ballot casting. Some technology categories remain unverified.

Central and Eastern Europe

Reviewed six country entries. Official sources support election-specific findings for Poland, Romania and Bulgaria; Slovak official results do not resolve voting technology, and Czechia and Hungary still need current official election guidance. Unverified technology categories are marked explicitly.

Baltic and Balkan election research

Six country entries were reviewed against election-authority material. Latvia allows manual or scanner-assisted counting for its 2026 Saeima election; other official sources document ballot procedures or election administration to varying degrees. Unknown technology categories remain clearly labeled as not established.

Six more European entries

Official materials clarify paper voting in Andorra and Azerbaijan, Armenia’s election-law requirements, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s limited 2024 technology pilots, and Kosovo’s ballot counting and results publication. Georgia still needs an election-authority technology source. The country tracker distinguishes partial reviews from verified technology categories.

Six additional European entries

Official guidance confirms paper postal ballots in Liechtenstein and Luxembourg; Malta’s Electoral Commission recruited electronic counting operators for its 2026 election. Moldova’s source concerns a proposed postal-voting amendment, not confirmed implementation. Belarus and Monaco remain pending election-specific official-source verification.

All 50 European entries have received an initial review

The final six entries distinguish paper ballots and fingerprint checks in North Macedonia, historical electronic-voting observations for Russia, San Marino’s paper ballot examples, Türkiye’s paper election procedures, Ukraine’s suspension of elections under martial law, and Vatican City’s non-comparable papal conclave. Coverage does not mean every technology category is verified.

Research reconciliation and evidence gaps

The 96 historical research flags have been reassessed against the latest dataset without automatically closing any. A separate evidence audit identifies 47 of 50 European entries with explicit uncertainty markers in at least one technology category. This is a data consistency audit, not independent verification of the cited sources.

Download issue-by-issue reconciliation

Download European technology evidence audit

Priority evidence review

Hungary’s 2024 official local-election guidance confirms paper ballots. Five other priority countries—Czechia, Georgia, Russia, Belarus and Monaco—still require election-specific primary sources. No unresolved category has been silently classified as absent.

Official election procedure updates

Official documents now support paper-ballot procedures in Czechia and Monaco. Georgia, Russia and Belarus still require current election-specific technology evidence. Counting, digital reporting, and electronic ballot casting remain distinct categories.

Georgia, Russia and Belarus evidence update

New election-law and election-commission sources clarify Georgia’s precinct electronic verification and scanning, region-limited remote internet voting authorized for Russia’s September 2026 elections, and Belarus’s 2025 paper presidential ballots. Election-specific limits and unverified categories remain explicit.

Batch 56 source findings

Updated research issue dispositions

Updated European evidence audit

Source-quality and reconciliation readiness

A metadata audit of 50 European entries identified 6 sources dated before 2024 and 0 entries citing selected secondary or observation domains. It flagged 49 historical issues for manual closeout review; none were automatically closed. These indicators do not replace checking the original source documents.

Download source-quality audit

Download issue closeout candidates

Evidence-backed research issue closeouts

Two historical secondary-source provenance issues have been closed using official election authority documents for Andorra and Azerbaijan. The other 94 issues remain open; this does not mean the two countries’ entire technology classifications are fully verified.

Download issue-by-issue closeout ledger

Download updated 49-candidate list

Evidence-backed election technology distinctions

Cyprus’s 2024 election guidance documents physical paper ballots and polling-station sorting/counting, while separate guidance documents electronic electoral-roll checks at specified stations. These are distinct technologies. Internet ballot casting and downstream electronic tabulation remain unestablished by the reviewed sources.

Evidence-based historical issue closeout

Hungary’s official 2024 local-election FAQ confirms paper ballots and document checks against a printed voter register. One secondary-source provenance issue has been closed narrowly; counting technology and internet voting remain unresolved. Three of 96 historical issues are now closed.

Batch 60 claim evidence

Full historical issue closeout ledger

Six source-provenance issues queued for verification

Croatia, Czechia, Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg have official-source candidates in the research master. The six historical secondary-source issues remain open until the underlying documents are checked against each original claim. Three prior issue closures remain intact.

Official-source claim verification

Four historical secondary-source provenance issues were closed for specific official-source claims in Czechia, Greece, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg. Croatia and Iceland remain open. Overall 7 of 96 historical issues are now closed; unresolved technology categories remain clearly labeled.

Croatia and Iceland primary-source verification

Official election instructions now support narrow procedural claims for Croatia and Iceland, closing two secondary-source provenance issues. The historical closeout ledger now records 9 of 96 issues closed. Older-source and incomplete-classification issues remain open.

North Macedonia official-source review

The State Election Commission’s voter guidance directly supports paper ballot casting and fingerprint voter checks. One historical secondary-source issue was closed for this narrow claim, bringing the historical ledger to 10 of 96 closed. Five further provenance cases remain queued for source-by-source verification.

Monaco and San Marino source verification

Official election guidance supports narrow paper-ballot and voter-identification findings in Monaco and San Marino. Two historical secondary-source provenance issues are closed; Kosovo, Malta and Slovenia remain open. Overall, 12 of 96 historical issues are closed.

Kosovo, Malta and Slovenia evidence

Official election-source evidence resolves three narrowly defined historical secondary-source issues. Kosovo election-worker training, Malta early-voting instructions and Slovenia referendum results distinguish physical voting, online administration and electronic reporting. Fifteen of 96 historical research issues are now closed; technology uncertainties remain visible.

Newer official election instructions

Official 2025 election instructions now support narrower, more recent claims for Croatia local elections and Czechia parliamentary elections. Two historical older-source flags were closed for those claims only; 17 of 96 historical research issues are now closed, while incomplete technology classifications remain open.

Newer election-source checks

Newer official records support limited source-age closures for Iceland (2026 municipal elections) and Kosovo (2025 local elections). Greece, Hungary and Liechtenstein remain open for source-age review. Nineteen of 96 historical issues are closed; voting technology gaps remain explicitly unresolved.

Election-specific source-age review

New official 2026 Hungary parliamentary guidance and 2025 Liechtenstein parliamentary instructions support two narrow historical source-age closures. Greece remains open because its newer electoral-roll publication does not address ballot technology. Twenty-one of 96 historical issues are closed.

Election scope matters

Greece’s public parliamentary paper-ballot procedures and the separate ZEUS online election platform should not be treated as the same election system. The source-age issue remains open. Montenegro sources are queued for document-level checks. Historical progress remains 21 of 96 issues closed.

Montenegro voting technology evidence

OSCE/ODIHR observations of Montenegro’s 2023 parliamentary election distinguish paper ballot boxes and polling-board counts from electronic voter-identification devices. The national election archive confirms election records but not equipment specifications. All three historical Montenegro flags remain open; 21 of 96 issues are closed overall.

Official voting procedures in Montenegro and Slovenia

Montenegro’s 2025 online voter-register lookup is distinct from online ballot casting. Slovenia’s election commission explains manual ballot counting and says current law does not provide electronic or internet voting. One narrow historical source-provenance issue was closed; 22 of 96 are now closed overall.

Five-country technology classification gaps

A new five-country evidence matrix separates ballot casting, vote counting, internet voting, voter checks, results transmission, and audits. Montenegro, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary and North Macedonia still have unresolved classification questions. No historical issues were closed in this batch; 22 of 96 remain closed.

Counting is not reporting

Slovenia’s 2024 official instructions document manual paper-ballot counting; its 2022 instructions separately document electronic entry and reconciliation of precinct totals. Hungary’s 2026 election portal publishes detailed precinct and constituency protocols, but those publications alone do not prove how ballots were counted or audited. Both incomplete classifications remain open.